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Abstract. This paper studies the following problem. An agent takes actions based on a
possibly misspeciﬁed model. The agent is large, in the sense that his actions inﬂuence the
model he is trying to learn about. The agent is aware of potential model misspeciﬁcation
and tries to detect it, in real-time, using an econometric speciﬁcation test. If his model
fails the test, he formulates a new better-ﬁtting model. If his model passes the test, he
uses it to formulate and implement a policy based on the provisional assumption that
the current model is correctly speciﬁed, and will not change in the future.
We claim that this testing and model validation process is an accurate description
of most macroeconomic policy problems. Unfortunately, the dynamics produced by this
process are not at all well understood. We make progress on this problem by relating
it to a problem that is well understood. In particular, we relate it to the dynamics of
constant-gain stochastic approximation algorithms. Doing this enables us to appeal to
wellknown results from the large deviations literature to help us understand the dynamics
of testing and model revision. We show that as the agent applies an increasingly stringent
speciﬁcation test, the large deviation properties of the discrete model validation dynamics
converge to those of the continuous learning dynamics. This sheds new light on the recent
constant-gain learning literature.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C120, E590
1. Introduction
Since the days of Frisch, Tinbergen, and Haavelmo, econometrics has held out the
hope of improving government policy, especially macroeconomic policy. Initially, eﬀorts
focused on issues of simultaneity and identiﬁcation, since these problems had not yet been
confronted by the experimental data of the natural sciences. By the early 1970s, these
problems were largely resolved, and applied econometricians could ply their trade using
a sophisticated toolbox of instrumental variables and two- and three-stage least squares
estimators.
Unfortunately, just as these methods began to seem routine, Lucas [30] and Sims [39]
advanced alternative,but equallydevastating, critiques of the CowlesCommissionmethod-
ology. Lucas argued that basic dynamic economic theory predicted that econometric mod-
els would not be invariant to changes in government policy. Policy changes would change
agents’ decision rules, and this would change the model. In this case, using a model to for-
mulate a new policy is invalid, unless it properly accounts for the reactions of the private
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sector. Cowles Commission methods did not do this.
1 Sims, on the other hand, did not
worry about regime changes. He argued that the notion of a regime change was fraught
with conceptual diﬃculties, associated with observing unexpected events, and even if such
things could be well deﬁned, they did not happen very often in practice, and hence, were
of limited importance to the task of implementing normal science. Instead, Sims focused
on the dubious nature of the Cowles Commission identiﬁcation strategy, based on large
numbers of zero restrictions.
In principle at least, both of these critiques have been overcome. The Lucas critique
suggested an alternative identiﬁcation strategy, based on cross-equation restrictions (see
Lucas and Sargent [29]). The Sims Critique was largely overcome by Sims himself, in his
development of VAR methods. Despite these successes, it is probably fair to say that a
cloud of skepticism still hangs over most macroeconometric research.
Why is this? One possible answer stems from a crucial assumption which, until quite
recently, has been maintained by virtually all macroeconometric research. Responding to
the Lucas Critique requires assumptions about the models that agents use when formulat-
ing their plans. The maintained assumption of current macroeconometric research is that
the government policymaker “knows the model”. Not only that, he knows the private
sector knows the model, and they know he knows the model, and so on, ad inﬁnitum.
That is, both the government and the private sector have a correctly speciﬁed model, and
this model is common knowledge.
2
Economistshave alwaysbeen uncomfortable with this assumption.
3 However, it has only
been recently that much progress has been made in weakening it. Our approach is inspired
by Sargent’s [36, 37] work on bounded rationality. This approach combines the following
elements: (1) There is a decisionmaker that takes actions based on a possibly misspeciﬁed
model, (2) These actions inﬂuence the true data-generating process. This is descriptive
of many large agent situations, like government policymaking. It also wreaks havoc when
attempting to apply classical statistical methods, which are based on the assumption of
an exogenous data-generating process. Instead, we are confronted with a self-referential
dynamic system [31] in which the data generating process interacts with the decision
marker’s belief formation process. As a result, all the classical convergence and consistency
theorems go out the window, and we must devise new methods that incorporate the
following features: (3) The decision maker is aware of potential model misspeciﬁcation,
and tries to detect it, in real-time, using best practice econometric methods; (4) If the
current model is rejected, he formulates a new model that is more in line with the data,
and ﬁnally; (5) If the current model is not rejected, he formulates and implements a policy
based on the provisional assumption that the current model is correctly speciﬁed and will
not change in the future. This last ingredient puts us squarely in the bounded rationality
camp, since the decisionmaker fails to recognize and respond to his own inﬂuence over
future data. He learns, but purely in a passive, retrospective way. Of course, it also
1However, Jacob Marschak [32], a Cowles founding father, was aware of the problem.
2During the past couple of years there has been a ﬂood of research on model uncertainty and robust
policies. We relate our approach to this research as we go along.
3See Frydman and Phelps [20] for an early collection of articles expressing doubts about the common
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side-steps the conceptual diﬃculties of a Bayesian approach (see, e.g., Bray and Kreps
[4]).
Confronted individually, each of these features can be handled. For example, due to
the work of Vuong [41] and Hansen and Sargent [21], econometricians now know how to
test and compare misspeciﬁed models. Due to the work of Chu, Stinchcombe, and White
[11] econometricians know how to detect model changes in real-time. Due to the work of
Marcet and Sargent [31] economists know how to analyze self-referential dynamic systems.
Unfortunately, when you combine all these elements, there are few, if any, results.
Our paper attempts to make progress on this diﬃcult problem. We do this by relating it
to a diﬀerent problem with known features. Speciﬁcally, we show that in a certain limiting
sense the dynamics produced by a testing-and-model-validation process are equivalent to
the dynamics produced by a continuously revised, constant-gain stochastic approximation
algorithm. Given this, we can then approximate our model validation dynamics by ap-
pealing to the recent results of Williams [42] and Cho, Williams, and Sargent [10]. These
papers apply large deviation methods to characterize the escape dynamics of adaptive
learning models. Escape dynamics are proving to be a useful way to model a wide-range
of markov-switching data, such as inﬂation stabilizations (Sargent [37]) and recurrent
currency crises (Kasa [23] and Cho and Kasa [8]).
The convergence between these two processes occurs as the decisionmaker applies an
increasingly stringentspeciﬁcation test. When testing, we assume he employs a generalized
relative entropy test (see Dembo and Zeitouni [17], ch. 7), which is known to be optimal in
the Neyman-Pearson sense, even for quite general alternatives. For this reason, Zeitouni
and Gutman [43] call it a ‘universal hypothesis test’. The use of a relative entropy test
is also quite natural here, given our focus on large deviations, since we know from Stein’s
lemma that there is a close connection between Type I and Type II error rates and relative
entropy, and we know from Sanov’s Theorem that there is a close connection between
relative entropy and large deviation rate functions.4 The test accepts the current model if
and only if the relative entropy between the data and the model does not exceed a given
threshold, say ρ>0. We do not have to say much about this threshold, since we focus
on the case ρ ↓ 0. More generally, one could specify ρ to optimally trade-oﬀ Type I and
Type II errors.5
When his model is rejected we assume the decisionmaker builds a new model using
maximum likelihood estimation. When ρ is large, these model revisions occur infrequently,
and as a result, the reference model path tends to be rather ‘jerky’. However, we show
that as ρ ↓ 0 the discrete model revision dynamics converge in a very strong sense to the
continuous recursive learning dynamics. In particular, both the testing dynamics and the
learning dynamics induce probability distributions over sample paths. Our convergence
result implies that these two probability distributions coincide not only in the ‘center’ of
the distribution, but also in the tails. From this, we can conclude that the two processes
share the same large deviation properties (e.g., escape routes and escape times) as ρ ↓ 0.
4See Cover and Thomas [16] for a nice discussion of Stein’s lemma. Dembo and Zeitouni [17] provide a
thorough discussion of Sanov’s Theorem.
5See, e.g., Lai and Shan [28]. They point out that under certain conditions relative entropy tests are
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This asymptotic equivalence result sheds new light on the rapidly growing constant-gain
learning literature. The early least-squares learning literature focused on the question of
asymptotic convergence to a Rational Expectations equilibrium.6 This is an inherently
nonstationary problem, and is mainly of theoretical interest. To explain observed time
series, there are great advantages to studying stationary equilibria. Constant gain learning
algorithms produce stationary equilibria. The recent constant gain learning literature has
shown that when agents suspect that the model they are learning about may be changing
over time, and they respond to their suspicions by placing more weight on recent data,
then persistent cyclical dynamics can sometimesresult. Interestingly, while these dynamics
conﬁrm the agents’ suspicions, they do so in an entirely self-referential way, since they only
occur because of the agents’ suspicions.
One common way to motivate constant gain learning is to highlight its connections to
more familiar Kalman ﬁltering approaches. As noted by Sargent [37], and discussed in
more detail by Sargent and Williams [38], constant gain recursive learning algorithms are
(nearly) equivalent to the Kalman ﬁlter when priors are based on ‘slow’ random walk
parameter drift. Drawing this connection is useful, because it reveals a potential problem
with contant gain learning models. In particular, the small-noise/random-walk speciﬁca-
tion of parameter drift in a sense ‘commits’ the agent to a constant rate of parameter drift,
when in fact, during escape episodes, the parameters may be changing quite rapidly. This
raises the question of whether we are inappropriately tying the hands of the agents in our
models.7
A model validation approach potentially avoids this inconsistency. Rather than adopt
the somewhat artiﬁcial assumption that agents update their models each period at the
same rate, we can instead adopt the more realistic assumption that agents monitor their
models continuously, but only abandon them if they go suﬃciently far oﬀ track. A time
invariant rejection threshold will automatically generate a greater rate of model revision
during times of economic turbulence. However, as we discuss later, a model validation
approach does face a similar issue, since we must decide how to use past data when
constructing our test statistics. The statistically optimal rate of discount may well be
time varying. We brieﬂy touch upon this issue at the end of the paper, in the context of
robust hypothesis testing [43, 33, 34].
Another payoﬀ from our result is that it helps us to understand a puzzling feature
of macroeconomic policy. Recent work by Cogley and Sargent [13] suggests that the Fed
actually began to suspect the short-term Phillips curve was misspeciﬁed by the mid-1970s,
several years before the Volcker disinﬂation. Cogley and Sargent attribute this policy
inertia to Bayesian model uncertainty. The Fed stuck to a high inﬂation policy because
it risk-dominated the policy implied by the better-ﬁtting model. Our paper provides an
alternative interpretation of policy inertia - even if a model is rejected, it is typically the
case that a similar model is the best ﬁtting model. That is, even though a tail-sensitive
test, like our relative entropy test, may detect a change, estimators like least squares or
6The treatise by Evans and Honkapohja [19] provides a deﬁnitive survey of this literature.
7Note, this issue is related to a recent debate between Sims [40] and Cogley and Sargent [12]. Sims
argues that heteroskedasticity, which is not properly accounted for in agents’ models, can fool them into
thinking their models are changing. Recent empirical work by Cogley and Sargent [15] suggests a role for
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maximum likelihood, which focus on ﬁtting the center of the distribution, will typically
dictate a modest model revision. Drastic policy changes only take place at self-conﬁrming
equilibria, where model rejections are surprising, and therefore, informative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the analysis
by outlining a version of the canonical Phillips curve example of Sargent [37]. Section
3 contains a detailed description of both the recursive learning dynamics and the model
validation dynamics. Various assumptions and regularity conditions are also discussed.
Section 4 proves that the H-functionals of the two processes converge to each other as
ρ ↓ 0. From Kushner [27], this is suﬃcient to establish convergence of the escape dynamics.
Section 5 discusses extensions, and section 6 concludes with some suggestions for future
research.
2. An Example
Although we formulate our results in a general setting, it is useful to begin with a
concrete example. A general treatment of the problem involves a lot of notation and
terminology, and it will be helpful to have observable counterparts in mind as we go
along. To do this we borrow heavily from Sargent [37] and Cho, Williams, and Sargent
[10] (henceforth denoted CWS).
2.1. Recursive Learning. Consider the following example of Sargent [37], in which
unemployment ut and inﬂation yt are assumed to evolve according to the expectation-
augmented Phillips curve:
(2.1) ut = u∗ − θ(yt − xe
t)+v1t,
where θ>0, xe
t is the private sector’s forecast of inﬂation, u∗ is the natural rate of
unemployment, and v1t is white noise. The realization of actual inﬂation yt is determined
by the government’s inﬂation target xt and a nominal shock v2t:
(2.2) yt = xt + v2t
where v2t is also white noise. Sargent [37] and CWS [10] impute a subtle form of mis-
speciﬁcation to the government, which misinterprets the role of private sector beliefs. In
particular, in place of the expecations-augmented Phillips curve, the government mistak-
enly believes in a Keynesian short term Phillips curve8.
(2.3) ut = γ0 + γ1yt
This misspeciﬁcation injects parameter drift into the government’s approximating model,
arising from the evolving beliefs of the private sector. The government responds to this
drift by using a discounted recursive least squares algorithm to update the coeﬃcient of
its model. Letting γ =( γ0,γ 1)T we have
(2.4) ˆ γt+1 =ˆ γt + aR−1







where the regression vector is φt =( 1 ,y t)T, the innovation is et = ut−ˆ γ0t−ˆ γ1tyt, and a is
the gain sequence. Some form of discounting is critical since one hopes that the estimates
8This speciﬁcation error is subtle in a sense made precise by Sargent [35]: given any historical data on
yt and ut, the two models (2.1) and (2.3) are observationally equivalent6 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA
will approximate the current best model in the parameterized model class in a changing
environment. The target inﬂation rate is selected by using the perceived model in (2.3) to






The solution gives the target inﬂation rate as a function of the government’s model,
parametrized by ˆ γt. In this example, we invoke Sargent’s “Fed Watcher” assumption,
meaning that the private sector knows the government’s inﬂation target:
xe
t = xt.
This allows us to focus on the behavior of the government, and can be replaced by a much
milder assumption. Note that the distribution of yt is aﬀected by three elements: (1) the
government’s model ˆ γt, (2) the state observed by the government, and (3) any relevant
states the government overlooks (in this case, the private sector’s expectation). Let Xt be
the observed state and Zt be any state which the government is not aware of, or simply,
fails to include in (2.3).9 We can write
(2.5) yt = br(ˆ γt,X t,Z t).
Following Sargent [37], we can calculate the Kydland and Prescott outcome, which corre-
sponds to the Nash equilibrium or the self-conﬁrming equilibrium where
(2.6) γe =( γe
0,γe
1)=( u∗(1+ θ2),−θ)
and the government sets the inﬂation target as
xt = θu∗.





and the government is committed to
x =0 .
One can show that as a → 0, the sample path induced by the recursive learning dynamics
can be approximated by a trajectory induced by an ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE)
˙ γ = ϕ(γ)
which has (2.6) as a unique stable stationary point. By “approximated”, we mean the
sample paths induced by the two dynamics are close in the topology of weak convergence
as the gain a → 0 in (2.4).
A simulation of a typical sample path of {yt} based on these speciﬁcations is shown
in Figure 1. Although this is a highly stylized model, the overall dynamics capture the
nonlinear aspect of post WWII U.S. inﬂation, i.e, persistent increases followed by sharp
decreases. The simulation also suggests that it might be dangerous to conclude that U.S.
9We interpret the missing state varaibles Zt broadly. Suppose the governement becomes aware of the
fact that realized inﬂation is aﬀected by expected inﬂation, but does not correctly specify the functional
form for the private sector’s expectation formation process. In this case, Zt would capture the gap between
the true expectations of the private sector and the expectations calculated by the government according
to its misspeciﬁed model.LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 7


















20th century U.S. inflation  Simulated inflation 
Figure 1. The right panel is the moving average of monthly C.P.I. in-
ﬂation (all items), and the left panel is simulated inﬂation based on the
recursive learning model.
inﬂation has been conquered, despite the fact that inﬂation has been under control for
the past 25 years [37].10 That is, Figure 1 reveals the need to consider large deviation
properties when evaluating the long run performance of policies [37]. With occasional
excursions away from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the overall average inﬂation rate is
signiﬁcantly lower than the self-conﬁrming equilibrium rate.
While recursive learning models oﬀer an elegant explanation of these complex dynamics,
this approach has been subject to criticism since the original work of Bray [3]. Learning
models are motivated by misgivings about the model speciﬁcation assumptions of the
Rational Expecations Hypothesis: even if agents do not know the exact model, they
at least know it up to some ﬁnite dimensional parametric class, and moreover, they all
have the same model. Learning models allow agents to entertain diverse and approximate
models, and to update their models in lightof new evidence. Still, it is rather discomforting
to assume that agents use the same misspeciﬁed model over time, without even a drop of
suspicion about the parametric validity of the model. Once the modeler endows him with
a parametric model, the agent is only allowed to update the parameters to ﬁt the data.11
As noted in the Introduction, this is particularly disturbing in this constant gain example,
because the data on inﬂation indicates that the underlying state may not be stationary.
In this case, smart agents may decide to look for a new parametric model.
A natural question is whether key qualitative and quantitative features of the learning
dynamics continue to hold if the model is subject to speciﬁcation tests prior to its use for
decision making. We now compare twodistinct settings: (1)The conventionalleast squares
learning model just discussed, and (2) An alternative model in which the decision maker
continually tests the “validity” of his model. One might expect the resulting validation
dynamics to be very diﬀerent from the dynamics found in the conventional model. In fact,
the reverse is true, which provides a powerful response to the above criticism of recursive
learning models.
2.2. Model validation. The key step to formalizing the idea of model validation is to
formulate a method that gives the government some sense of the reliability of the current
model based on the current estimate ˆ γt. In this example, we impose two restrictions in
order to illuminate the key ideas.
10Further details along with a formal analysis can be found in [10].
11It should be noted that there are small literatures devoted to relaxing this assumption. See, e.g., Chen
and White’s [7] work on nonparametric recursive learning, and Brock and Hommes [6] work on forecast
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A1.v i,t ∼ N(0,σ2
i), and the policy maker knows the correct distribution.
A2. the policy maker’s model is conﬁned to the parametric class (2.3).
These assumptions greatly simplify the computation of the test statistics. Because the
policy maker knows the distribution, we side-step a potentially important source of model
uncertainty.12 We shall return to distributional uncertainty after we present the main
results. The second assumption delineates the class of models of the government, which
is the class of linear regression models with 2 ﬁxed explanatory variables. In principle,
the number of explanatory variables could be endogenously determined through a model
selection process.
Let Mt be the test statistics computed from the data. While one can consider diﬀerent
kinds of speciﬁcation tests, we opt for the relative entropy criterion for two reasons. First,
for a broad class of models, a threshold relative entropy test is optimal in the sense of
Neyman-Pearson [43, 17]. In fact, relative entropy and likelihood ratio tests are widely
used as speciﬁcation tests (e.g.,[41]). Second, relative entropy is intimately linked to the
Kullback-Leibler information criterion for model selection. This enables us to formulate
the testing and selection of models in a uniﬁed framework.
Since we restrict our focus to linear Gaussian models, Mt can be completely represented
by the sample mean ˆ µt and the sample covariance matrix ˆ Σt, which can be estimated
recursively as



















where [·]T is the transpose of [·].
Suppose that the government’s model is ˜ γk =( ˜ γ0,k,˜ γ1,k). Let M˜ γk be the probability
distribution over (ut,y t) when the government takes an action based on ˜ γk. Deﬁne the






Let µ˜ γk and Σ˜ γk be the mean and the covariance matrix of M˜ γk. If both models have














− 2+(ˆ µt − µ˜ γk)
TΣ−1
˜ γk (ˆ µt − µ˜ γk)
!
At the beginning of period t, the government has model ˜ γk, characterized by an esti-
mated short term Phillips curve
ut =˜ γ0,k +˜ γ1,kyt
It then puts ˜ γk to the test:
(2.7) H0:( ut,y t) is generated by M˜ γk.
12This issue is addressed in [33, 34].LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 9
The government validates ˜ γk if and only if
I(MtkM˜ γk) ≤ ρ
for a ﬁxed threshold ρ>0. If H0 is accepted, the government uses the short term Phillips
curve to set the inﬂation target in period t.I f˜ γk is rejected, then the government builds




Within the conﬁnes of linear Gaussian models, ˜ γk+1 is precisely the maximum likelihood
estimator, which can be calculated using recursive least squares. Then, the government
chooses the inﬂation target in period t based on ˜ γk+1. We refer to the resulting dynamics
of ˜ γk and yt as the validation dynamics.
2.3. Simulations and Observations. Figure 2 reports typical sample paths from two
simulations when the threshold for the speciﬁcation test is ρ =0 .0015, which in this case
is quite stringent. Not surprisingly, when the threshold is relatively large, the validation
dynamics can diﬀer markedly from the learning dynamics, since the parameters under
the validation dynamics are evolving much more slowly than under the recursive learn-
ing dynamics. However, as Figure 2 reveals, as the government runs a more stringent
speciﬁcation test, the two sample paths become virtually identical.

















Figure 2. Typical sample paths of inﬂation with more stringent speciﬁ-
cation tests. The left panel reports the sample path from the validation
dynamics, and the right panel depicts the sample path generated by the
recursive learning dynamics
We shall formally demonstrate that as the government runs a increasingly tight valida-
tion test by reducing the threshold ρ>0, the large deviations properties of the validation
dynamics converge to those of the learning dynamics. This asymptotic equivalence pro-
vides a new behavioral foundation for recursive learning dynamics.
Validation tests, especially those based on relative entropy, can detect discrepancies
between the reference model and the data even in the tails of the distribution. However,
maximum likelihood or least squares estimators choose models that ﬁt the data near
the center of the empirical distribution. Even if the short term Phillips curve reveals
discrepancies from the data in the tails of the distribution, the best ﬁtting model remains10 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA
the short term Phillips curve until the state of the economy reaches the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. U.S. data suggests this occurred in early 1980’s. The resulting policies exhibit
inertia along the convergent path. Even when the short term Phillips curve is rejected by
the speciﬁcation test, the government may appear to cling to the same model with only
slightly diﬀerent parameters, pursuing the same high inﬂation policy. However, once the
economy reaches the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, rejections of the reference model become
unlikely events. Thus, conditioned on the rejection, the new reference model can diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from the status quo model, which explains the drastic policy changes that
take place around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
3. A General Framework
3.1. Recursive Learning. Let (X,Z) ∈ X × Z ⊂ Rm × Rn−m be a state vector, where
X is a vector of observable variables, and Z represents variables which the decision maker
does not observe, or simply does not include in his model for any reason. To simplify
exposition, assume that X is compact.13 Let P be the set of all possible models available
to the decision maker. We assume that P is the set of all linear models deﬁned over the
elements of X, including lags of X up to ` periods. In this paper, we assume that ` is
exogenously given so that we can parameterize a model by a vector β of coeﬃcients in





where L is the lag operator
L`βtXt = βt−`Xt−`
and ξt is the regression residual. Let β be the proﬁle of all regression coeﬃcients.
Given βt, the decision maker takes an action br(βt,X t) ∈ X, which results in an outcome
proﬁle (yt,z t) ∈ X×Z in period t from which only yt is observed by the decision maker. We
assume that br(·) obtains by solving an optimization problem. Based on yt, the decision
maker modiﬁes the regression coeﬃcient βt according to a recursive formula:
(3.9) βt+1 = βt + aΨ(βt,X t,Z t)
for a>0, which is the gain sequence. Note that the right hand side includes Zt, which
the decision maker is not aware of. Although Zt is not observed, it aﬀects the evolution
of βt because yt is inﬂuenced by Zt. Let
(3.10) ˙ β = Ψ(β)









Ψ(βt,X t,Z t) | β1 = β,X1 = x,Z1 = z
#
.
We make a number of assumptions to ensure that (3.10) is a reasonable approximation
of the sample paths induced by (3.9) as a → 0.
13The case where X is unbounded can be handled if the probability distribution of X has suﬃciently
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Assumption 3.1. (1) If ∃K ⊂ Rm which is convex and compact so that βt+1 6∈ K,
then there exists a projection facility that pushes βt+1 back into the interior of K.
Along the boundary of K, the gradient vector of (3.10) is pointing to interior of
K.
(2) Ψ(β) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function, and ∃βe in the interior of K such
that Ψ(βe)=0 . βe is a locally stable in the sense of Lyapunov.
(3) Given β ∈ Rm, the probability distribution induced by (3.8) is i.i.d over time with
a full support over X, and the decision maker knows the distribution of ξt.
(4) ∃M>0 such that
(3.11) E[exphα,Ψ(β,X,Z))i]≤ exp|α|M ∀α ∈ Rm.
Under Assumption 3.1, the set of sample paths induces by (3.9) converges to the trajec-




a→∞P(|βt − βe|≤￿)=1 .
See Dupuis and Kushner [18] for a formal proof. At βe, the beliefs of the decision maker
are conﬁrmed, even if the decision maker’s model is not properly speciﬁed. Thus, we call
βe the self-conﬁrming equilibrium [37].
The third condition implies that the innovation in each period is i.i.d. for a given
perception of the decision maker. We can easily expand the model to cover the case where
the innovation term evolves according to an ARMA process. Note that as βt changes
in response to the sequence of observations, the regression residual need not remain i.i.d.
The assumption that the decision maker knows the correct distribution ξt diﬀerentiates our
exercise from the robust decision making problem analyzed in [33, 34]. After presenting
the main result, we shall explore the consequences of dropping this assumption so that
the decision maker entertains more general forms of model uncertainty.
While we are intentionallyavoiding distributionaluncertainty, the decision maker is still
exposed to two kinds of model misspeciﬁcation. First, his model may be under-speciﬁed,
as he is not aware of Z. Second, and more importantly, his model may not capture the
complex interaction between the evolution of his model and the evolution of the state
variables. The second misspeciﬁcation diﬀerentiates the analysis of this paper from the
econometric literature on speciﬁcation testing [41], where the data generating mechanism
is exogenously given.
Condition (4) is commonly known as Cramer’s condition, which essentially implies the
existence of the moment generating function of Ψ(β,X,Z). This is a standard condition
to ensure that the distribution of Ψ(β,X,Z) does not have excessively thick tails.
Because we need to investigatethe large deviationproperties of (3.9), we need additional
notation. Deﬁne the H-functional as
(3.12)











Ψ(βt+k,X t+k,Z t+k))i|βt = β,Ht

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where Ht is the sigma algebra generated by information at t. The Legendre transform of
the H-functional is deﬁned as
(3.13) L(β,ζ,t) = sup
α
[hα,ζi−H(α,β,t)]





where φ(0) = β and φ is absolutely continuous; otherwise, S(β,T,φ)=∞. The action
functional captures the ‘cost’, in probabilistic terms, of any given path. Less likely paths
are assigned higher costs.
Dupuis and Kushner [18] show that if H is α-diﬀerentiable at α = 0 then (3.9) satisﬁes
the large deviation upper bound:14
(3.15) lim
a→0






At = {φ | φ(0) = βe, ∃t,φ(t) 6∈ Nδ(βe)}
and the equality holds along the dominant escape path out of Nδ(βe). In general, calcu-
lating the large deviation rate function, S∗, is a challenging calculus of variations problem.
However, Williams [42] shows that in Linear-Quadratic/Gaussian settings the action func-




[ ˙ φ − ¯ Ψ(φ)]0Q†[ ˙ φ − ¯ Ψ(φ)]dt φ(0) = β
where the weighting matrix Q contains information on the likelihood, or ‘cost’, of depar-
tures from the mean dynamics. For example, at a given value of β, the instantaneous
escape direction is just given by the eigenvector associated with the smallest eigenvalue of
Q†. The full dynamic path can be obtained by solving a set of matrix Lyapunov equations.
3.2. Validation Dynamics. Consider a decision maker who is aware of possible model
misspeciﬁcation, and therefore runs a speciﬁcation test before using the model to guide his
decision. Because the objective of this process is in a certain sense to validate his current
model, we call the induced dynamics of the regression coeﬃcients and the observed state
variables the validation dynamics. This alternative behavior is an abstraction of the casual
observation that policy makers search for better models by routinely running speciﬁcation
tests and selecting a best possible model for a given set of available data. Instead of
focusing on a speciﬁc testing method, we shall consider a class of rules that satisfy fairly
common properties.
As in the recursive learning models, t =1 ,2,...represents “calendar” time. We call
the model the decision maker uses to guide policy a reference model. Let γk ∈ Rm be the
k-th reference model. Because the same reference model can be used over many periods,
typically k ≤ t.
14By duality, the α-diﬀerentiability condition can be replaced by the condition that there exists a unique
ζ
∗ satisfying L(β,ζ
∗,t)=0 .LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 13
We assume that the reference model has the same m parameters as the recursive learning
model, because the reference model is also subject to possible misspeciﬁcation. If γk is
validated, the decision maker chooses an action and yt = br(γk,X t,Z t) ∈ X is realized in
period t.
To be validated, the model parametrized by γk must pass a relative entropy speciﬁcation
test. To illustrate the validation process, it is more convenient to represent a model
by a probability distribution on X induced by γk. Because of the feedback feature, γk
inﬂuences the underlying probability distribution, in particular, of X ∈ X. Let Mγk be
the probability distribution induced by γk. The causality here is very important. Unless
γk is a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, γk need not be the best ﬁt model for the distribution
Mγk.
The test statistic is constructed from the empirical distribution Mt:




where tk is the ﬁrst point in time when the present reference model γk is implemented. If
the reference model is replaced, then the decision maker should discard old data, because
they are generated under diﬀerent regimes. However, even if one ﬁxes tk =1∀k, the same
analysis goes through.
We use relative entropy to deﬁne the discrepancy between the two probability distri-
butions, which requires the existence of the Radon-Nikodym derivative. To this end, we
need to “smooth” out the empirical distribution so that the test statistic has full support
over X. Let ˆ Mt be the smoothed empirical distribution: ˆ Mt is atomless and the support
of ˆ Mt is X and
(3.18) ˆ Mt −M t → 0
with probability 1 as t →∞ . We intentionally remain vague about the speciﬁc details
of the smoothing method which might depend on the characteristics of the assumed X
distribution. For example, in the Gaussian case it suﬃces to estimate recursively the ﬁrst
two moments from the data to build ˆ Mt.
Deﬁne
Ia






whenever d ˆ Mt
dMγk
is well deﬁned. Otherwise,
I( ˆ MtkMγk)=∞.
as the relative entropy between the smoothed empirical distribution and the reference
model. Clearly, (3.18) implies that Ia
t,k is a consistent estimator of the relative entropy:
∀a,k, Ia
t,k − I(MtkMγk) → 0 with probability 1.
Because the empirical distribution is constructed recursively after a new reference model
is implemented, it is reasonable to assume that Ia
t,k can be approximated by a deterministic
process.14 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA
Assumption 3.2. As a → 0, {Ia
t,k} can be approximated by a trajectory of the determin-
istic path induced by
˙ It,k = ϕ(It,k)























We can now describe formally the validation process. Let γ1 = γ ∈ Rm be the initial
reference model, and ρ1 = 0 be the initial reference value. Fix ρ>0, k ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1.
Given reference model γk in period t, test statistics Ia
t,k, a reference value ρk, and threshold
ρ>0, the decision maker uses γk to choose an action in period t if and only if
(3.19) Ia
t,k ≤ ρ + ρk.
If Ia
t,k >ρ+ ρk, the decision maker discards γk and choose γk+1 by solving




and if there exist multiple solutions, the decision maker chooses the one with the fewest
parameters.
Ma
t,k is absolutely continuous with respect to Mγ. The minimized value provides the
reference value ρk+1 for γk+1, which is in fact the lowest relative entropy possible. Es-
sentially, the decision maker is constantly searching for a “better” model in the sense of
reducing relative entropy.
If m = n and the model is properly speciﬁed in a statistical sense, then (3.19) is just
a likelihood ratio test, and (3.20) describes maximum likelihood estimation. In contrast
to standard statistical testing problems, the notion of a “true model” is changing over
time here. Thus, it is not unusual for the decision maker to reject a misspeciﬁed model
and replace it by another misspeciﬁed model. Thus, our selection process is close to what
Vuong [41] proposes. Yet, the alternative hypothesis is not well speciﬁed in our case, while
the null hypothesis is that the reference model is an accurate description of the state. In
this sense, our testing procedure is the non-robust version of the universal testing method
[43, 33, 34].
In case of the Gaussian perturbations, as illustrated in section 2, ˆ Mt is induced by a
maximum likelihood estimator. Thus, once the reference model is rejected, the decision
maker can borrow the maximum likelihood estimator from ˆ Mt to construct γk+1. In this
case, ρk+1 = 0. In general, if we restrict m ￿ n, then ρk is typically bounded away from
0. In a certain sense, ρk > 0 is the penalty the decision maker pays for using a restricted
class of models.
For later reference, let us deﬁne the H-functional for the validation dynamics:
(3.21)











Ψ(γk,X t+k0,Z t+k0)i|γt = γ,Ht

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and similarly, we can deﬁne the mean dynamics for the validation dynamics as












Ψ(γk,X t,Z t) | γ1 = γ,X1 = x,Z1 = z
#
where γk evolves according to (3.19) and (3.20).
4. Results
We shall now prove that the sample path properties of the validation dynamics converge
to those of the learning dynamics as the testing threshold goes to zero. As pointed out in
section 2, it is not enough to prove that the trajectories of the mean dynamics are close.
We must also show that the large deviation properties get close as ρ → 0.
It is instructiveto ﬁrstexamine the convergence of the mean dynamics. This impliesthat
if the initial model is not a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the recursive learning dynamics
and the validation dynamics push the model along the same trajectory.




Proof. The basic idea of the proof is simple. If γ is not a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, then
the reference model is rejected in ﬁnite time with probability one, because the decision
maker’s action changes the underlying probability distribution. For small a>0, the
interval that a reference model survives converges to a deterministic time. That time
interval shrinks as the decision maker runs a tighter speciﬁcation test: ρ → 0. Thus, the
reference model is updated frequently as in the recursive learning model.
To formalize this intuition, recall that the evolution of the test statistic Ia
t,k converges
to a deterministic process
˙ It,k = ϕ(It,k).
∀It,k, it takes τk,ρ amount of time to get rejected.





with γ1 = γ. Let Ta
k be the random time when the k-th reference model is rejected. Since
the test statistics converges to a deterministic process, we know ∃ζk > 0 such that
a(Ta
k+1 − Ta
k) → ζk16 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA





























































As ρ → 0, the right hand side is an average of Ψ(γk,X tk,Z tk). As τ → 0, we obtain
(3.10). Q.E.D.
However, this logic does not apply if γ is the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, because the
mean dynamics around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium vanish. Around the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium, we need to compare probability distributions of unlikely events, which are
governed by large deviation properties. While the analysis of large deviations in principle
requires us to minimize the action functional, Kushner [27] proves that if two H-functionals
converge uniformly, then so do the large deviation properties, such as escape paths and
expected escape times.






Fix τ>0. Because Ψ(γ) = 0, the reference model is the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, and
therefore, rejection is an unlikely event when a → 0. By (3.15), characterize the bound
for the probability: ∀τ>0,
P(∀Ta
k,aTa
k ≥ τ | γ = βe) ≥ 1 − e−S∗/a.
Because the rejection time is random, it is necessary to examine two separate cases.
Case 1. ∀Ta
k, aTa
k ≥ τLEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 17
In this case, which occurs with probability at least 1− e−S∗/a, the initial reference model
is not rejected. Thus, throughout dτ/ae periods, the decision maker continues to take the



















This is a small probability event, but also is the case where γk is changing. As a result, we
have little idea about the size of the forecasting error, because γk is selected to minimize
the Kullback-Leibler distance rather than the forecasting error. Here, we have to use the
rate function in combination with the fact that we can choose τ>0 arbitrarily small
before letting a →∞ . Although we have little idea about the forecasting error, (3.11) in































where the inequality uses both the ﬁrst part of Assumption 3.1 and the large deviations








|α|M(τ + a) − S∗ < 0.
Thus, the right hand size converges to 0 as a → 0.
Combining the two cases, we conclude that the ﬁrst case dominates in determining the
value of Hρ(α,γ,t), which is precisely H(α,γ,t). Thus, the H-functional of the validation
dynamics converges uniformly to that of the recursive learning dynamics. Q.E.D.
5. Discussion and Extensions
The previous analysis is quite general, and can be extended in a number of directions.
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss two that are likely to be important in applications. First,
we show that lagged variables and two-sided learning can be incorporated into the analysis.
Second, we comment on how the recent work of Meyn et al on robust hypothesis testing
could be used to relax our assumption that agents know the true error distribution. We
also speculate that this might lead to an alternative method of calibrating robustness.18 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA
5.1. Lagged variables and two-sided learning. In a companion paper (Cho and Kasa
[8]), we argue that model validation dynamics might be a contributing factor in observed
ﬁnancial crises. The analytical framework is similar to the one used here, but in order to
ﬁt some important features of observed crises, we had to relax two assumptions. First, in
order to generate real eﬀects from crises, we needed to relax the ‘Fed watcher’ assumption.
In this case, both the government and the private sector must learn. Second, to match
observed persistence in the real eﬀects, we needed to add a lag in the output equation.
We use the well known third-generation crisis model of Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee
[1] to do this.
Consider a policy maker who wants to control the exchange rate, st, and output, yt,
to achieve some objective. This objective could reﬂect some well deﬁned notion of social
welfare, or alternatively, as we assume, be an ad hoc quadratic loss function:







δt[λ(yt − y∗)2 +( st − s∗)2]
where Eg denotes expectations based on the government’s beliefs. Output and the ex-
change rate are related to each other by the following dynamic ‘expectations-augmented
Phillips curve’:
(5.23) yt =¯ y(1− α)+αyt−1 + θ(st − E
p
t−1st)+σ1ε1t ε1t ∼ N(0,1)
where Ep denotes expectations based on the private sector’s beliefs. Note that with Ra-
tional Expectations (and common information sets), Ep = Eg, and they both use the
true objective probability distribution. Here we do not impose the Rational Expectations
Hypothesis. Instead, we assume the policy maker must learn about the relationship be-
tween the exchange rate and output by witnessing the response of output to his sequence
of exchange rate choices. Likewise, the private sector must learn about the government’s
exchange rate policy, using the observed histories of output and the exchange rate and
a guess about the functional form of the government’s policy function.15 In contrast to
Bayesian learning, we do not allow for any experimentation or strategic interaction in
these learning problems. Both sides learn, but purely in a passive, retrospective way.16
The government’s approximating model is assumed to take the following form:
(5.24) yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2st + u1t
As before, this imputes a subtle form of speciﬁcation error to the government. Whereas
in reality it is only unanticipated devaluations that matter, the government mistakenly
believes that the exchange rate by itself matters. As a result, the evolving beliefs of the
private sector inject ‘parameter drift’ into the government’s approximating model.
15In [8] we show that under certain conditions the large devations properties of the model are governed
soley by the beliefs of the government, even when the private sector’s beliefs are adaptive.
16Kreps [26] provides arguments in favor of this approach to learning. He calls it ‘anticipated utility’.
Cogley and Sargent [14] show in the context of a standard permanent income model that anticipated utility
and Bayesian learning produce very similar outcomes. However, they also caution that the two learning
strategies can depart signiﬁcantly when agents are highly risk averse.LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 19
The government solves the optimization problem in (5.22) given its perceived model in




where β =( β0,β 1,β 2), and g0(·) and g1(·) are diﬀerentiable functions of β. Following Sar-
gent and CWS, assume that the actual exchange rate is equal to the planned exchange rate,
s
p
t, plus an i.i.d. shock, which captures random implementation errors or high frequency
money demand shocks. Thus, the market exchange rate is,
(5.26) st = s
p
t + σ2ε2t ε2 ∼ N(0,1)
In this model the only action the private sector takes is to forecast the exchange rate.
It does this using an econometric model. Assume that its model is correctly speciﬁed, in
the sense that it is consistent with actual government behavior:
(5.27) st = γ0 + γ1yt−1 + u2t
Note that with CWS’s Fed watcher assumption we would have γ0 = g0(β) and γ1 = g1(β).
Substituting (5.25)-(5.27) into (5.23) then delivers the actual law of motion as a function
of the beliefs of the government and private sector:
(5.28) yt =¯ y(1 − α) − θγ0 +( α − θγ1)yt−1 + θst + σ1ε1t
where st is given by (5.26). Because of model misspeciﬁcation, agents’ beliefs will not con-
verge to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Instead, they converge to a self-conﬁrming
equilibrium, deﬁned to be a situation where agents no longer have an incentive to revise
their models. In [8] we show this model has a unique self-conﬁrming equilibrium, and that
it is E-stable if 0 <α<1.
As before, we assume agents update their beliefs using constant-gain stochastic approx-
imation algorithms. The only diﬀerence is that now, with two-sided learning, we must
specify two gain parameters. While it might be interesting to explore the eﬀects of dif-
ferential learning rates, for most of our analysis we assume the gain parameter of the
government equals the gain parameter of the private sector.
Figure 3 reports representative sample paths from this model. The key parameter values
are as follows: (1) ap = ag = .04, which implies a half-life of data relevance of about 17
time periods, (2) θ = −0.3, which reﬂects our assumption that adverse balance sheet eﬀects
dominate liquidity eﬀects, so that unanticipated devaluations are contractionary (see [8]
for details), (3) λ =1 .5, which implies that output ﬂuctuations are more costly than
exchange rate ﬂuctuations, (4) ¯ y =1 .0 and y∗ =1 .2, which reﬂects the usual assumption
in these models that the target output level exceeds the natural rate, and (5) σ2
1 = .0003
and σ2
2 = .0001, which implies that real shocks are more volatile than nominal shocks.
Three main features jump out at you in these simulations. First, at least in a qualitative
sense, the exchange rate paths resemble the observed exchange rate histories of many crisis
prone countries. There are prolonged periods of gradual appreciation, followed by rare but
recurrent crisis episodes, where the exchange rate depreciates sharply. In this particular
case, they occur about once every 1000 periods, i.e., about once every 4-5 years if the time
unit is a day, or about once every 20 years if the time unit is a week. Increasing the gain
parameters or the shock variances increases the frequency of crises. Second, crises cause
recessions, with output typically falling by about 10% during a crisis. Of course, this is20 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA



































































Figure 3. Example Simulation of Dynamic Model: ag = ap = .04
not a coicidence. Generating contractionary devaluations is the raison d’etre of the third-
generation crisis literature. Here it is entirely driven by our assumption that θ is negative.
Finally, the third feature to notice is that crises are intimately connected to the evolving
beliefs of the government. The two plots in the left-hand side of Figure 3 depict the paths
of the coeﬃcient estimates. The up-and-down pattern of the exchange rate coeﬃcient
estimate mirrors the up-and-down pattern of the exchange rate. What’s happening here
is that the government is vacilating between Sargent’s [35] two observationally equivalent
ways of interpreting the data. Crises occur when the government confuses the natural
rate properties of the model with the apparent absence of balance sheet eﬀects. In [8] we
provide a more detailed account of these dynamics.
For our purposes here, it is more useful to illustrate how the validation dynamics of this
model converge to the recursive learning dynamics. To do this, we simulated the model 30
times (each one consisting of T = 3000 time periods) for two diﬀerent values of the relative
entropy threshold, ρ. Figures 4 and 5 depict a representative outcome when ρ = .08. The
top row of Figure 4 reports values of relative entropy and a (0,1) indicator variable for
model rejection. Vertical lines represent a rejection. The middle row shows the paths of
output and the exchange rate for the validation dynamics, and the bottom row does the
same thing for the learning dynamics.
For this particular run, the average time between model rejections is 34 periods. How-
ever, notice that during an escape rejections arrive more frequently. This can also be seen
in Figure 5, which reports the paths of the coeﬃcient estimates for the same simulation.
The top row contains the learning dynamics and the bottom row contains the validation
dynamics.
Notice that while the model is converging to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium there can
be prolonged periods without model revision. However, once a self-conﬁrming equilibriumLEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 21
























































































































Figure 4. Representative Sample Paths of the Validation and Learning
Dynamics: ρ = .08
is rejected, and an escape is ignited, model rejections pile up and the coeﬃcient estimates
move rapidly toward their (distorted) natural rate values.
Although Figures 4 and 5 are interesting, they provide no information on the conver-
gence of the validation dynamics to the learning dynamics. For that we need to compare
simulations for alternative values of ρ. Also, we need to recognize that there is going to
be some sampling variability. Larger ρ values can sometimes produce closer alignment
between validation and testing dynamics. We need to make sure we don’t get unlucky (or
lucky, for that matter). Hence, Figues 6 and 7 compare the distributions of outcomes for
diﬀerent values of testing threshold ρ.
In particular, for each of the 30 simulations we computed the L2 distance between the
exchange rate paths induced by the model validation dynamics and the recursive learning
dynamics. That is, if smv(t) denotes the model validation path and srl(t) denotes the






Note that this is actually a weaker sense of convergence than our theorem predicts, since
it does not restrict tail discrepancies. Nonetheless, it does give some sense of sample path
convergence.22 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA


























































Figure 5. Sample Paths of the Coeﬃcient Estimates: ρ = .08
Figure 6 reports smoothed histogramsfor ρ = .03 and ρ = .08.17 Although not dramatic,
Figure 6 depicts a clear sense of convergence. A smaller value of ρ causes the exchange
rate paths to become more aligned and the distribution of L2 distances to shift left.
What lies behind this convergence is a more rapid rate of model revision. Figure 7
reports model rejection rates for the same set of simulations. For each of the 30 runs we
computed the average time to rejection by dividing 3000 by the total number of rejections.
As discussed earlier, this is a bit misleading, since rejection rates are not constant over
time, i.e., they occur more frequently during escapes and less frequently while the model
is in the neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Once again, we smoothed the
raw histograms with a kernel density smoother.
Figure 7 shows that when ρ = .08 the average reference model lasts for about 40 periods
before it is rejected, i.e., a little bit less than a year if the time unit is a week. When ρ
falls to .03 the average survival time drops to only about 25 periods.
5.2. Robust validation. Earlier we alluded to a debate between Sims [40] and Cogley
and Sargent [12] about the presence of regime changes in U.S. inﬂation data. Sims points
out that if agents ﬁt models with homoskedastic error terms when in fact the data are
heteroskedastic, they may be fooled into inappropriately inferring that there have been
17The histograms were smoothed with matlab routine ksdensity, using the default gaussian kernel.LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 23
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Figure 6. Probability Distribution of the L2 Distance between Validation
and Learning Exchange Rate Paths
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Figure 7. Probability Distribution of the Average Time Until Model Rejection
breaks in the data, and as a result, inappropriately reject their models. Sims’ point is
relevant for us too. Until now we have assumed the decision maker knows the model’s
error distribution, even if he doesn’t know its parameters. What if his beliefs about
this distribution are wrong? If he ignores this possibility then he exposes himself to the
kind of error that Sims highlighted. Our goal here is not just to model policymakers
as econometricians, but to model them as good econometricians. Good econometricians
worry about robustness.
If the only thing he had to worry about was parameter estimation and distributional
uncertainty, there would be a straightforward response - use GMM rather than maximum24 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA
likelihood. However, the agent we model is not just an econometrician, he is a decision
maker who uses his model to devise a control policy. Moreover, this control policy inﬂu-
ences the data-generating process.18 This means that he must make enough assumptions
about his environment that he can solve his control problem, and this necessarily exposes
him to greater speciﬁcation risk than if he just needed to estimate parameters.
Our approach to this problem is to blend the recent literature on robust control and
ﬁltering (Hansen and Sargent [22]) with the recent literatureon robust inference in moment
condition models (Kitamura and Stutzer [25] and Kitamura and Otsu [24]). We do this
by building on the work of Pandit [33] and Pandit and Meyn [34]. As in the econometric
literature on information-theoretic GMM and empirical likelihood, we deﬁne models by
parameterized moment conditions. However, for us, these moment conditions do not come
from economic theory; they deﬁne a permitted class of model perturbations, within which
Hansen and Sargent’s‘evil agent’can select a model to subvert the agent’s model validation
and control eﬀorts. The more moment conditions there are, the less freedom the evil agent
has, and hence, the less robust will be the outcome.
An important by-product of a robust model validation approach is that it endogenously
delivers a ‘robustiﬁed’ reference model. Existing work on robust control is silent about
where the robustness-seeking agent’s reference model comes from. It only considers per-
turbations to a given reference model. In addition, due to the links between KLIC and
Type I and Type II error rates, our approach endogenously generates detection errors.
Current work on robustness speciﬁes these errors exogenously, as a device to calibrate
‘reasonable’ amounts of robustness. (See Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent [2]). Instead,
our approach exogenously speciﬁes a set of moment conditions.
So let’s now drop the assumption that the decision maker knows the exact distribution
of ξt so that the decision maker faces some form of model uncertainty. In this case, it
is natural for the decision maker to pursue some form of robustness in the validation
and decision making process. We formulate the robust validation process following the
framework of [33, 34]. It will be more convenient to represent the regression equation in
the form of (3.8). Let φ be the marginal distribution of X. If the decision maker knows




However, we now assume the decision maker has only partial information about the distri-
bution. Instead of the exact distribution, the decision maker knows only a few moments.
For example, consider the following moment-constrained set of parameterized models
P(β)=
n





t. In this case, the decision maker does not know the exact distribution
of the regression disturbance. He only knows the ﬁrst two moments. The number of
restrictions imposed on the moment class can be interpreted either as an expression of the
decision maker’s bounded rationality or as an expression of his preference for robustness.
18Remember, however, that in keeping with our assumption of bounded rationality, we assume the
agent ignores this feedback.LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 25
If he knows the correct distribution of ξ, he must know every moment of ξ, and therefore,
the moment class is subject to an inﬁnite number of constraints. The ﬁniteness of the
constraints can be interpreted as a bound on his capacity to process information, which
exposes him to model uncertainty.
For ρ1 > 0 and a probability distribution φ on X, deﬁne
Qρ1(φ)=
￿







For a small ρ1 > 0, we can interpret Qρ1(φ) as the class of models which are diﬃcult to
diﬀerentiate from φ. Similarly, Qρ1(P) is the class of models that are diﬃcult to distinguish
from models in P.
The robust validation process can now be deﬁned as follows. Let φk be the probability
distribution over X induced by the present reference model parameterized by γk. Given a
“smooth” empirical distribution ˆ Mt, deﬁne
L( ˆ Mt,γ k) = inf
φ∈P(γk)
I( ˆ Mtkφ)
as the “worst case” relative entropy over P(γk). If
L( ˆ Mt,γ k) <ρ 2,









where U(·) is the one period payoﬀ, and ut =( ut,u t+1,... ) is the sequence of controls. If
L( ˆ Mt,γ k) ≥ ρ2,






With γk+1 in place of γk, the decision maker solves (5.30).
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to model macroeconomic policymakers as econometricians.
We’ve done this by combining recent work in both macroeconomics and econometrics.
From macroeconomics, we’ve borrowed from the work of Sargent [36, 37] on boundedly
rational learning dynamics. From econometrics, we’ve borrowed from recent work on
robust hypothesis testing [43, 33, 34] and the analysis of misspeciﬁed models [41, 21]. As
it turns out, this produces a rather diﬃcult, and as yet unconsummated, marriage.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, it is diﬃcult because we abandon the Rational Ex-
pectations Hypothesis, thereby putting ourselves into the ‘wilderness of bounded rational-
ity’. We do this not because we like to analyze diﬃcult and ill-posed problems, but simply
because of the casual observation that, as econometricians, macroeconomic policymakers26 IN-KOO CHO AND KENNETH KASA
do not spend their time reﬁning estimates of a known model, but instead spend most of
their time searching for new and better models. Of course, it is not necessary to abandon
Rational Expectations and traditional Bayesian decision theory when confronting model
uncertainty. (See, e.g., Brock, Durlauf, and West’s [5] work on Bayesian model averaging).
However, we think there are good reasons to explore alternative approaches. (See, e.g.,
Hansen and Sargent [22], Kreps [26], and Bray and Kreps [4]).
The marriage between macroeconomics and econometrics is diﬃcult from an econo-
metric standpoint because, presumably, policymakers have some inﬂuence over the data-
generating processes they are attempting to learn about. The econometric analysis of
misspeciﬁed models with endogenously generated data is truly uncharted territory.
We make progress on this problem by relating it to a problem that is relatively well
understood, namely, the dynamics of constant gain recursive learning algorithms. We
prove that as the government employs an increasingly stringent speciﬁcation test, the
dynamics generated by a process of testing and model revision, which we call validation
dynamics, converge in a very strong way to the dynamics generated by recursive learning
models. This is a useful connection to make, because it enables us to apply the results
of Williams [42] and Cho, Williams, and Sargent [10] on escape dynamics to help us
understand a wide range of markov-switching macroeconomic dynamics. Looking at it
from the other side, a second payoﬀ from making this connection is that it provides a
more secure behavioral foundation for recursive learning models.
Although we feel this paper takes a signiﬁcant step forward in understanding the in-
terplay between macroeconomics and econometrics, there are certainly many loose ends
and unexplored avenues remaining. Perhaps the most promising one is to follow-up on the
connections between robust validation, robust control, and robust inference in moment
constrained models that were brieﬂy outlined in section 5.2. We are actively pursuing this
in ongoing work [9].LEARNING AND MODEL VALIDATION 27
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